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LARGUMENT
A. The District Court's Ruling that Marquardt Owed No Duty to Robinson was Clearlv

Erroneous.
1. Defendant Misinterprets Harrison v. Taylor.

The lynch pin of Defendant's argument is the notion that a "tenant steps into the shoes of
the landlord" for the purposes of liability to a third party who comes onto the property, citing to
the following language from Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989):
Similarly, a tenant or lessee, having control of the premises is deemed, so far as
third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties
occasioned by the condition or use of the premises, the general rule is that the
tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair.
115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329. However, Defendant both misinterprets the language of this
Court and takes that statement out of context. Defendant would rewrite the foregoing language
to read:
Similarly, a tenant or lessee has control of the premises and thus is deemed, so far
as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third
parties occasioned by the condition or use ofthe premises, the absolute rule is that
the tenant or lessee is liable for failure to keep the premises in repair.
Defendant plucks this sentence out of a paragraph which further reveals the fallacy of
Defendant's position:
[T]here is an additional basis for reversing the ruling of the trial court
here. Either a tenant, or a landlord, or both, may be liable to a third party for
injuries resultingfrom negligent repairs orfailure to repair. Even in the absence
of a specific lease provision, and with no controlling statute requiring him to
make repairs, if a landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs he is bound to use
reasonable and ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work. 49 AmJur.2d
§ 795, p. 746 (see cases cited therein). Similarly, a tenant or lessee, having control

of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concemed, to be the owner,
and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the
premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to
keep the premises in repair.
ld. at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329 (citations and references to the record omitted) (emphasis added).
This Court was not fashioning a rule that a "tenant steps into the shoes of the landlord if the
tenant is the occupier of the premises and is aware of the alleged dangerous condition." Brief of
Respondent, p. 8. Rather, this Court stated (l) that either the tenant or the landlord or both may
have liability to third persons depending on who had the responsibility to repair or maintain the
premises, and (2) that if a tenant has control of the premises, a tenant may be liable for failure to
keep the premises in repair. The matters that remained issues of fact for trial, according to this
Court, were whether the landlord or the tenant had responsibility for maintenance of the sidewalk
and who had contJOI ufthe premises. ] 15 Idaho at 597, 768 P.2d at 1330.
The district court in this case erred in determining as a matter of law that Marquardt had
no duty to Robinson in light of Harrison v. Taylor and in light of the evidence before the Court.
The uncontroverted evidence regarding maintenance and repair of the premises was that in 2008,
Marquardt replaced an old, drafty door leading to the second-story deck which had no safety
railing. R. p. 70. In addition, the lease between Marquardt and \\'inkelman, the tenant said
nothing about maintenance of the premises and certainly did not require Winkelman to do any
repair or maintenance. R. p. 78. Finally, the record lacks any evidence that Winkelman did any
repair or maintenance on the upstairs apmiment he rented from Mrs. Marquardt, who lived
downstairs.

R. p. 35.

The inference from this evidence

:2

IS

that Winkelman did not have

responsibility for repair or maintenance of the premises and that the duty to repair and maintain
the premises was reserved by Marquardt. Thus, there were issues of fact concerning who had a
duty to Robinson that precluded the district cOUli's granting summary judgment.
The district court ened in leap-frogging over genuine issues of material fact that should
have been reserved for trial and in adopting wholesale Defendant's argument that only the tenant
owes a duty to a third person on the rented premises. A tenant who has control of the premises
and who is responsible for maintenance and repair may owe a duty of care to a third party;
however, where there are issues of fact with respect to control and responsibility for maintenance
and repair of the premises, summary judgment should be denied.

"As this Court stated in

Harrison, '[ d]isputes in this area will normally present a jury question under particular facts,
unless reasonable minds could not differ. '" Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 676, 273
P.3d 1266, 1269 (2012) (quoting Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329)).

B. The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider the General Dutv to Exercise Ordinarv
Care.

The district court failed to address the Plaintiff s argument that every person has a
general duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid subjecting others to foreseeable, unreasonable
harm. R. pp. 95-102. This was clear error. This Court's decisions have made it clear that
premises liability is not the only basis of liability of a property owner to another person. In

Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008), the Court of Appeals pointed
this out:

Our Supreme Court has suggested that premises liability is not the
exclusive source of duties where a landowner is involved. Instead, circumstances
may give rise to a general duty of care owed to third parties. See Turpen [v.
Granieri}, 133 Idaho [244,247-48],985 P.2d [669, 672~73 (1999)]. As a general
principle, every person, in the conduct of his or her business, has a duty to
exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to
others. Id. at 247, 985 P.2d at 672; Sharp v. W.H Moore Inc, 118 Idaho 297, 300,
796, P.2d 506, 509 (1990). However, our Supreme Court has also made clear that
not every person or entity owes a tort duty to everyone else in all circumstances.
Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247-48,985 P.2d at 672-73. J

Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393-94, 179 P.3d 352, 356-57 (Ct. App. 2008).
Boots v. Winters, like Turpen v. Granieri, involved not a condition on the land, but
activities on the land. However, Sharp v. WH Moore Inc. involved an unsafe condition: the
third floor fire escape door with an allegedly faulty lock that could be left unlocked. Sharp, 118
Idaho 297, 299, 796 P.2d 506, 508 (1990).
In Sharp, invol ving the rape of a tenalli' ~ employee at work, the Court posited the general
dutY"
to exercise ordinary care as "another reason" for finding, a dutv.: of care to exist in that case:
. : . . .
'-'

Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this case is the general
rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks
of harm to others. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980);
Harper v. Hoffinan, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974).
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to
injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in
operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his
property as to avoid such injury. [Citations omitted.] The degree
of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the danger or
hazard connected with the activity. [Citations omitted.]

The Supreme Court in Twpen noted that the landlord's "only ability to prevent the harm"-the death of
a college student from alcohol poisoning while attending a party at the rented premises-"would be by
refusing to rent the premises at all. The COUli thus held that the landlord had "no duty under the very
limited facts presented here." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673.
I
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Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188,418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966). Whether the
duty attaches is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the
risk.
Sharp v. W.H Moore, 118 Idaho at 300,796 P.2d at 509 (emphasis added).
The Court stated that foreseeability is a flexible concept that vanes with the
circumstances of each case. "Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not
difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened
injury is minor, but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability
may be required," ld. (citing

u.s.

1'.

Carrol! Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)

(Judge Learned Hand); Isaacs r. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Ca1.3d 112,211 Cal.Rptr. 356,
695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985)).
Defendant contends that Robinson's position would render premIses liability law
meaningless.

Defendant argues that this Court's discussion of the balancing of the harm

approach in Sharp was simply an "analogy

to

establish why a landlord owes an invitee a duty of

reasonable care." Brief of Respondent at 16. The fallacy of Defendant's arguments concerning

Sharp is readily apparent in the language employed in Sharp. First, in Sharp this C0U11 did not
base liability on premises liability and the status of the Plaintiff as an invitee. In fact, this Court
stated: "The question of whether a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenants of the
property was settled by our recent decision in Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41

(1984)." Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300,796 P.2d at 509. Second, this Court in Sharp stated that "in
addition to the clear rule of Stephens," the general rule of liability was "another reason for
finding a duty of care." Id.
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Defendant also maintains that the general rule of liability is not applicable because the
duties owed to invitees, licensees and trespassers have been defined.

This argument is not

supported by Sharp, in which this Court offered the general duty of care as an additional basis
for liability. It is not supported by the language of any of the cases discussing the general duty of
care. This duty is described by the Courts as owed by all persons. Turpen v. Granieri, 133
Idaho, 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999); Sharp v. W.H Moore, 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d
506,509 (1990); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135. 137 (1980); Harper v.

Hoffman. 95 Idaho 933, 935. 523 P.2d 536, 538 (1974): Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188,
418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966); Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393-94, 179 P.3d 352,356-57 (CL
App.2008).
The duty is based on foreseeability and a balancing of the harm. As stated in Robinson's
main brief, when a second-story deck (or recessed dormer or patio) is accessed by a door in the
apartment and the deck does not have a protective railing surrounding it: it is foreseeable that
harm may result from the lack of a railing. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Turpen, Marquardt
had the ability to take reasonable steps to prevent the foreseeable risk of harm inexpensively.
She only had to install a protective railing around the deck.
The Court of Appeals in Boots v. Winters pointed out that balancing of the harm is
emrarzed in onlv in the rare circumstances when a court is called on to extend a dutv beyond its
>..,;

'--'

.;

..

previously recognized scope or when a duty has not previously been recognized.

..'

Robinson

seeks recognition that the landlord's duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to tenants
extends to the tenant's guests either directly through Stephens or through an extension of the

6

Stephens rule; thus, it is appropriate to consider the general duty to exercise reasonable care as an
additional basis for liability.

C. The Defendant Misinterprets Stephens v. Stearns.
Ignoring the agrarian-based feudal genesis of landlord immunity for dangerous conditions
on the land, Defendant argues that the Court in Stephens and in Sharp "simply expanded the
definition of an invitee to include the tenant of a landlord, but did not include guests of tenants."
Brief of Respondent at 11. For several reasons, Defendant is incorrect. First, the Court did not
use a premises liability/invitee analysis in either case. As set forth above, this Court in ShaTp
stated that "[t]he question of whether a landlord owes a duty of reasonable care to the tenants of
the property was settled by our recent decision in Stephens v. Srearns." Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300,
796 P .2d at 509.
The concurring opinion in Marcher

1'.

Butler, cited with approval by the majority' in

Harrison v. Taylor, pointed out that the decision in Stephens did not employ the invitee/licensee!
trespasser analysis used in premises liability cases:
In Stephens v. Stearns, supra, we heJd that the measure of a landlord's duty is not
determined under trespasser-licensee-invitee analysis, but rather, "A landlord
must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the
likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the
burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Id., at 258, 678 P.2d at 50, quoting
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.S. 388,308 A.2d 528,534 (1973). The landlord's duty to
exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances extends to his or her
tenant or anyone on the premises with {he tenant's consent. PagelsdOlf v. Safeco
Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 91 Wis.2d 734,284 N.W.2d 55, 61 (1973).
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Marcher, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and Huntley, JJ., concurring) (emphasis
added).
Second, the injured parties in Stephens and Sharp were tenants, so liability to tenants'
guests was not an issue in either case. However, extending a landlord's duty of reasonable care
to tenant's guests was not excluded by the Court in either case and neither case stated that its

holding was expressly limited to tenants.
Third, this Court in Stephens comprehensively eliminated landlord immunity. Quoting
with approval from Sargent

1'.

Ross, it simply held landlords to a standard of reasonable care

under all (not just the) circumstances:
"We thus bring up to date the other half of landlord-tenant law. HencefOlih,
landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to
an unreasonable risk of harm .... A landlord must act as a reasonable person
under all of the CIrcumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the
probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the
risk. "

Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent

v.

Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d

528, 534 (1973)). And the Stephens Court did not simply quote this language from Sargent v.
Ross. It also held: "[W]e today decide to leave the common-law rule and its exceptions behind,
and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances." Stephens. 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P .2d at 50. Thus, when Defendant points out
that Robinson reads Stephens to hold landlords to a reasonable care standard under all
circumstances, Defendant is correct.
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Defendant also grumbles that Robinson cites to out-of-jurisdiction cases in support of her
arguments. It is an odd complaim given that most of the out-of-jurisdiction cases Robinson cites
in her brief are cases this Court relied on in Stephens in eliminating the outdated and unfair
system oflandlord immunity for dangerous conditions on the rented premises. 2
Robinson cautions the Court against being led astray, as the district court was, by
Defendant's improper superimposing of premises liability, with its emphasis on the status of
entrants on the land, on landlord liability. These are different theories of liability and are not to
be muddled together. Defendant argues, for example, that because Stephens did not concern a
tenant's guest, tenant's guests, as licensees, are only owed a duty to warn.

This is a prime

example of how Defendant muddles the two theories of liability. As set forth in Robinson's
main brief, in PagelsdOl/v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 734,284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979),
the landlord (Mahnke) and the tenant's guest (Pagelsdorf), agreed that the extent of Mahnke's
duty to Pagelsdorf turned on whether Pagelsdorf was an invitee or licensee. The Supreme Court
of Wisconsin disagreed, noting that under the common law, when property was leased, the

With the exception of Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hasp., 38 Ca1.3d 112,21 J CaLRptr. 356, 695 P.2d
653 (]985), and u.s. v. Carroll Towing Co .. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), discussing balancing of harm,
the other out of jurisdiction cases were cited in Stephens, or in cases relied on by this Court in Stephens.
See Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50, wherein the Court stated that several states in addition to
Tennessee and New Hampshire had judicially adopted a reasonableness duty of care for landlords, citing
to PagelsdOliv. Safeco ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis. 2d 734,284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979), and Young v.
Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162,402 N.E. 2d 1045 (1980), among many other cases. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H.
388,308 A.2d 528 (1973), and Wilcox v. Hines, JOO Tenn. 538,46 S.W. 297 (1898), were disclIssed at
length and relied on by this Court in Stephens, 106 ldaho at 257-58, 678 P.2d at 49-50. Kline v. Burns,
J II N.H. 87,276 A.2d 248 (1971), was quoted by Sorgen I v. Ross, 113 N.H. at 399,308 A. 2d at 535.
Antonieyl'icz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836,236 N.W. 2d I (1975), was discussed by the Wisconsin
Supreme CouI1 in PagelsdOlf 91 Wis. 2d at 739-41, 284 N.W. 2d at 558-59.
2

9

landlord was not liable for injuries to his tenants or their guests resulting from defects in the
premises, unless certain exceptions applied.

PagelsdOl~(,

91 Wis. 2d at 739-4L 284 N.W. 2d at

558-59. In other words, the premises liability distinctions between invitee and licensee were not
part of the old landlord immunity analysis. The landlord did not have a duty to anyone, absent
certain exceptions.
That the two theories should not be confused is further supported by Marcher v. Butler in
pointing out that in Stephens the measure of a landlord's duty was not determined under
trespasser-licensee-invitee analysis. Marcher, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and
Huntley,

n., concurring).

See also Harrison

1'.

Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 593-94,768 P.2d 1321,

1326-27 (1989) ("The trial court's reliance upon the traditional law pertaining to invitees was
misplaced. The test is one of reasonableness under all the circumstances, not one of hidden or
obvious dangers, or exceptions to the traditional general rule of non-liability for landlords.)
(quoting Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and Huntley, IT.,
concurring».
Defendant's analysis demotes Slephens v. Stearns to a mere anomaly. Her analysis
ignores the language employed and the cases relied on by the Court.

If this Court intended

landlords to have the same duties as owners/occupants under a premises liability theory, it would
have said so. If this Court intended that the focus of the analysis for landlords is the status of the
person coming onto the leased premises, surely it would have said so. Instead, the Court adopted
the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the
circumstances.

Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50.
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Arguably, "all circumstances"

include injuries suffered by a tenant's guest due to a dangerous condition on the premises.
Instead, this Court quoted with appro"al the mandate that a landlord must "act as a reasonable
person under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable
seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Stephens, 106
Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973)).

D. Defendant is Not Entitled to Attornev's Fees.

The trial court ruled as a matter of law tbat Marquardt owed no duty to Robinson. Even
if Defendant's analysis and arguments concerning Stephens v. Stearns vis-a-vis tenant's guests is
correct, and even if her analysis of the general duty to exercise reasonable care is correct, the
district court nevertheless ignored issues of fact with respect to the duty to maintain and repair
the premises and thus who had control of the premises, and accordingly a duty to warn Robinson.
On that basis alone, summary judgment was inappropriate. Moreover, Robinson is not asking
this Court to second-Q:uess the district cOllli's leQ:aJ
rulinQ:s.
......
......
'-'

Rather, Robinson is askinQ. this
'-'

COUli to give no deference to the trial court's legal rulings and to establish that Stephens v,

Srearns indeed applies to a tenant's guests, something the district expressly declined to do. R. p.
99.

Robinson is asking this COUli to hold that an additional reason for reversing is that

Marquardt also had a general duty to use her property in such as way as to avoid subjecting
others, including Robinson, to an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm. Robinson is basing her
arguments for an extension or declaration of the law on this Court's prior decision in Stephens
which has not been overturned, and on Shmp, which has also not been overturned. Accordingly,

i1

this appeal has a strong basis in the law and was not brought frivolously. Defendant's request for
attorney's fees should be denied.

n. CONCLUSION
There is nothing frightening or extraordinary about the landlord duty to exercise
reasonable care under all of the circumstances. It is the standard of care by which we all order
our conduct so as to avoid subjecting others to unreasonable risks of foreseeable harm. It does
not sentence a landlord to strict liability, nor does it require a landlord to take every possible
precaution. It only requires reasonableness. Recognizing or extending this standard of care of
landlords to their tenant's guests also serves the public policy of requiring landlords to provide
reasonably safe premises.

It serves the purpose of encouraging reasonable repair and

maintenance of rental premises. Robinson respectfull.y requests the Court to reverse summary
judgment ruling that landlords are held to a standard of reasonable care under all the
circumstances, including toward the guests of a landlord's tenants.
Respectfully submitted this !]!)ray of October, 2013.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A .

.T.C. Meyer
for Plaintiff Tv,,'ylla
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